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Abstract  
Software Process Improvement (SPI) has been widely adopted by software organizations to enhance 
their capability to effectively deliver quality software. The approach has several positive merits. But 
many initiatives fail because the software processes are never adopted in practice. This paper offers a 
comparative analysis of the implementation strategies and outcomes of 18 SPI initiatives within 
Ericsson. The analysis draws upon concepts from the diffusion of innovations literature and leads to 
four different process implementation strategies – High Way, Country Road, Crossroads, and Dead 
End Street. These roads to software process implementation target different levels of practice and they 
rely on different mixtures of process push and practice pull. Our research suggests that the High Way 
with its combination of strong push and strong pull is the most promising road to implementation 
success, whereas the other roads imply serious barriers to success.  





Many software organizations have adopted Software Process Improvement (SPI) as a systematic 
approach to enhance their capability to deliver quality software (Humphrey 1989; Grady 1997; 
Mathiassen et al. 2002). A number of successful cases are reported (Diaz and Sligo 1997; Hayley 
1996; Humphrey et al. 1991). But there are also many less successful. The Software Engineering 
Institute reports data from 1,638 organizations that have engaged in SPI (SEMA 2002). Only 34 per 
cent proceeded with a second assessment, 13 per cent of these did not improve their capability to 
develop quality software, and 3.1 per cent moved to a lower level of capability. The average time to 
move up one level (out of five) was 16-32 months. These data show that SPI efforts are complex 
change processes with many sources for failure (Aaen et al. 2001). 
SPI initiatives are performed in a step-wise and evolutionary fashion based on existing practices 
(Humphrey 1989; Aaen et al. 2001). They start by diagnosing the software operation (Humphrey 
1989; McFeeley 1996) to identify change initiatives. Each initiative focuses on a particular process, 
e.g. requirement management or project tracking and oversight; it develops new approaches; and it 
seeks to change practices based on the new process. There are many sources of failure along this 
evolutionary path. The diagnosis can fail to capture relevant problems; the new process can fail to 
effectively address practical needs; and the SPI initiative can fail to implement the new processes. 
This research focuses on the overall objective of SPI: to improve current practices through 
implementation of new or modified processes (Humphrey 1989). The key concept underlying our 
research is hence process implementation, i.e. the activities required to bring a new or modified 
software process effectively into engineering practice. The involved actor’s competence (i.e. what they 
know), commitment (i.e. how they prioritize) and participation (i.e. what they do) is further used to 
characterize different strategies to implementation. We present data from Ericsson AB in Gothenburg, 
Sweden. The data cover 18 SPI initiatives carried out in the period 1998 to 2001. All initiatives were 
similar in terms of engineering environment, management attention, development technology, and 
resources. But the implementation strategies and outcomes differed. Some initiatives succeeded while 
others failed. These data provide unique opportunities to study key factors that enable or create 
barriers for successful process implementation in SPI. 
Section 2 presents the SPI literature on process implementation and introduces the notions of process 
push and practice pull. We use these concepts to characterize variations in the strategies for process 
implementation. Section 3 describes the organizational context at Ericsson and how the case study was 
performed. Section 4 presents the 18 cases and interpretations in terms of four different roads to 
process implementation. Section 5 discusses our findings. 
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Most of the literature on SPI (Fuggetta and Picco 1994; Paulk 1999; Aaen et al. 2001) builds on the 
ideas of Watts Humphrey (1989). His emphasis on process implementation is clear: “the key focus of 
change agents is on improving the practice of software engineering - they do this by working with 
software practitioners both to provide them assistance and to stay current on project problems”, 
“commitment to SPI from both management and practitioners is necessary to accomplish successful 
SPI”. Humphrey (1996) has also argued that innovation requires creation and implementation again 
stressing the importance of bringing new processes into practice. Another key source on SPI  
(McFeeley 1996) stresses the importance of committing resources to drive the SPI work and 
committing practitioners to participate to assure successful SPI. Process implementation is, in this 
way, addressed as a key issue in SPI theory. 
Practitioners tend, however, to focus on the practical guidelines in the Capability Maturity Model 
(CMM) (Humphrey 1989; Paulk et. al.1995) and the IDEAL model (McFeeley 1996). The CMM is 
focused on key processes and maturity levels. Little is said about process implementation except for 
one particular key process, ‘Integrated Software Management’ (CMM level 3), that addresses process 
tailoring. The IDEAL model provides guidelines for how to organize SPI initiatives. The model is 
based on five recommended phases: Initiating, Diagnosing, Establishing, Acting and Leveraging. 
Process implementation is stressed in the acting phase through the ‘Rollout Solution’ and ‘Transition 
to Long-term Support’ activities. This indicates that process implementation issues are addressed, but 
not strongly emphasized in SPI guidelines. 
Kautz and Nielsen (2002) offer a framework for understanding process implementation in SPI. Based 
on Slappendel’s work (1996) they distinguish between three perspectives. The individualistic focuses 
on the behavior and commitments of individual actors; the structuralist emphasizes the environment 
for change; and the process perspective focuses on the complex interactions between individual action 
and structural conditions. Kautz and Nielsen suggest that the process perspective leads to the deepest 
understanding of the complex dynamics involved in process implementation and it provides a partial 
roadmap to guide implementation efforts (2002). 
General knowledge on diffusion of innovations (e.g. Rogers 1995) has been adopted to understand 
better the challenges faced in SPI (Ardis and Marcolin 2001; Pries-Heje and Tryde 2001). A practical 
framework for planning process implementations is provided by Pries-Heje and Tryde (2001). Based 
on a diagnosis of common failures in SPI practices they developed a workshop scheme for planning 
process implementations. The workshop focuses on understanding the target for process 
implementation (Mathiassen and Sorensen 1997), on deciding which roles to be played by different 
actors (Checkland and Scholes 1990), on determining the whole product that suits customer needs 
(Moore 1998), on designing an implementation approach (Eason 1988), and on resolving 
implementation risks (Iversen et al. 2002). The workshop has been successfully adopted by other 
organizations (Andersson and Nilsson 2002). 
Aaen (2002) argues that the possibility to achieve successful SPI is higher when SPI practitioners 
work in close cooperation with software developers (End-user SPI) compared to situations where 
change agents develop solutions of their own (Improvement by Design). End-User SPI requires 
change agents with dedicated time to work with SPI and committed practitioners willing to work with 
the change agents. 
One of the most important issues in forming a diffusion strategy in software organizations is the 
rationale for adopting the technology (Mathiassen and Sorensen 1997). Diffusions can be driven by a 
demand pull, where the reason for adopting a new technology is organizational needs triggered by a 
performance gap, or, diffusions can be driven by a technology push, where the reason for adoption is 
based on the espoused benefits of the new technology (Zmud 1984). In the specific case of process 
implementation we can distinguish between practice pull, where the competence, commitment, and 
participation of the practicing software engineers is the key driver, and process push, where the 
diffusion is driven by the competence, commitments, and participation of the SPI practitioners. Zmud 
(1984) suggests that successful diffusions are based on a considerable pull element. 
3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
Many SPI initiatives fail despite the focus on process implementation in the literature. This indicates 
that we need to know more about key factors that enable or create barriers for successful process 
implementation. Our research addresses this issue by contrasting successful and less successful SPI 
initiatives. An interpretive case study (Galliers 1992; Yin 1994; Walsham 1995) is well suited for that 
purpose. The research is part of a collaborative practice study (Mathiassen 2002) carried out at one of 
Ericsson’s system development centers with over 20 years of experience developing packet data 
solutions for the international market.  The organization has grown from 150 employees in 1995 to 
900 in 2002 and SPI has become an increasingly important area to assure quality deliveries. 
18 different SPI initiatives are presented, analyzed and compared. All initiatives were executed in the 
same organizational context and in most cases with the same people involved. One of the authors has 
been working in and been responsible for the initiatives. The potential bias and subjectivity is handled 
through the collaboration with the other author who was not involved in any of the cases. The study is 
interpretive (Galliers 1992; Walsham 1995) and action based (Yin 1994) with a focus on process 
implementation. 
SPI outcomes are ideally measured in improvement success, i.e. differences in quality and productivity 
between old and new practices (Humphrey 1989; Grady 1997). Improvement success is, however, 
difficult to measure without comparable data from longitudinal studies. Our research focuses on the 
extent to which initiatives lead to changes in software practices. This notion of implementation 
success is easier to measure and validate and it can be considered an important prerequisite and 
indicator for improvement success (Börjesson and Mathiassen 2003). 
The basic data was collected from different sources by the SPI unit during the initiatives based on 
unlimited access to time registration reports, SPI initiative final reports, and SPI project specifications. 
In addition, data were collected through 25 open-ended, semi-structured interviews with software 
practitioners, project managers and SPI initiative members. The use of different sources and 
interviews with the involved actors made triangulation of data possible. The resulting data from the 18 
cases are presented in Table 1 and the Appendix and the involved practitioners have verified them. 
4 PROCESS IMPLEMENTATION PRACTICES 
The 18 initiatives were planned and executed under similar conditions. They addressed the same 
engineering operation, they were part of Ericsson’s intensive SPI program, they had the same strong 
level of management attention, they had the same level of resources, and many of the SPI practitioners 
were the same. Table 1 provides a summary of the 18 cases (Appendix contains more extensive data). 
For each case we present the following data: 
 
Process: The process area adressed by the initiative. 
Volume: The # of weeks, # of man hours, and # of people participating in the initiative. 
Target: The level of the software operation that the initiative targetted.  
Process Push: The competence, commitment and active participation of the SPI team to create and 
implement a process.  
Practice Pull: The competence, commitment, and active participation of the software engineers to 
create and implement a process 
Success: The degree to which the process was adopted as part of software engineering practices. 
 
These data focus in key issues pointed out in the IT diffusion and SPI literature, i.e. which process was 
implemented and on which organizational level (Humphrey 1989; Paulk et. al.1995) and the degree of 
process push and practice pull (Aaen (2002); Zmud 1984. The data show how implementation 
strategies and outcomes differed significantly. The initiatives targeted different levels of the software 
operation and they exercised different mixtures of process push and practice pull. All initiatives 
intended to create changes in the software operation and each initiative was at the time of execution 
believed to be successful. But the data show that some initiatives succeeded to implement the 
processes while others failed. If we categorize the 18 cases depending on the degree of process push 
and the degree of practice pull we arrive at four different roads to process implementation at Ericsson 
as described in Figure 1. 
The Dead End Street initiatives focused on the core process. The main attention was directed toward 
process definition and tailoring. The target was the company, i.e. several units were expected to use 
the new process. The process often became hard to use out-of-the-box as many compromises had to be 
made to fit all needs. The process push was in this way low. The practice pull was also low because 
there were too many practitioners with different needs and backgrounds. A typical Dead End Street 
initiative will not happen. No one is really committed to implement the processes. The organization 
will rarely benefit from such initiatives. 
The Country Road initiative was oriented towards engineering practice. The SPI members were 
allocated to spend time working with engineering issues in practice and they were strongly committed 
to support and change practice. The target level was therefore typically individual projects and the 
process was ready to use. The practitioner commitment was, however, weak. The software engineers 
did not understand why they had to be involved and they did not allocate time to work with process 
implementation. The process push was high, but the practice pull was low. A typical Country Road 
initiative can happen, but it is going slowly and it is likely to fail in implementation. 
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200 man hours 
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Action Strong Strong High 
Table 1:  Summary data for the 18 cases. 
 
The Crossroad initiatives targeted several units on the company level. The requirements were very 
similar across the units and compromises were not needed. The software engineers understood the 
need for new processes and they were committed to use them; the practice pull was high. But the SPI 
practitioners hadn’t allocated time to work with process implementation; the process push was low. A 
typical Crossroad initiative can happen. But the software engineers have difficulties choosing what 
road to take and there are no resources to guide them and to facilitate the process. 
The High Way initiatives targeted practice. The main focus was on solving practical problems. Few 
compromises had to be made as the initiatives targeted a specific project or unit. The SPI practitioners 
were committed and had time allocated to processes implementation. The process push was high. The 
software engineers understood the need for new approaches and they appreciated the SPI initiative. 
The practice pull was high. A typical Highway initiative will happen and the results will be 
implemented and used. The organization can directly benefit from such initiatives. 
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Process ready to use. 
Weak practitioner commitment. 














# 3, 5, 8 
Process hard to use. 
Strong practitioner commitment. 




# 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18 
Process ready to use. 
Strong practitioner commitment. 
SPI will happen. 
 
Figure 1:  Four roads to process implementation at Ericsson. 
5 DISCUSSION 
We need to ask why so many of the projects failed given that they were based on considerable SPI 
training, they intended to change practices, they had appropriate resources, and they had strong 
management support. Our discussion of this issue is related to both theory and practice. 
5.1 Implications for Theory 
One possible explanation of the reported cases of implementation failure is that SPI theory is 
ambiguous. Process implementation issues are stressed (see Section 2). But there are a number of 
conceptual traps that invites practitioners to underestimate the importance of process implementation. 
The key literature on SPI (e.g. Humphrey 1989; McFeeley 1996) makes no explicit distinction 
between process and practice. Process covers both prescriptions for practice and practice itself. Also, a 
lot of emphasis is put on process tailoring, i.e. on transforming a process to suit specific needs. While 
this is an important activity, it is necessary to stress that tailored processes still need to be 
implemented. Without a clear understanding of the difference between process and practice and 
without a strong emphasis on process implementation in addition to process tailoring practitioners are 
easily lured into adopting simplistic strategies for process implementation. Finally, as pointed out in 
Section 2, there is a strong emphasis on process implementation principles in the SPI literature (Watts 
Humphrey 1989, 1996; McFeeley 1996), but the issue needs to be more emphasized and supported in 
the authoritative guidelines for SPI, i.e. the CMM (Humphrey 1989; Paulk et. al.1995) and the IDEAL 
model (McFeeley 1996). 
The existing literature on process implementation provides useful knowledge on process push tactics 
and practice pull tactics. The strong emphasis on both SPI and engineering commitment (Humphrey 
1989; McFeeley 1996) supports the Highway to process implementation. End-user SPI (Aaen 2002) 
can be seen as a particular form of the Highway where SPI practitioners work in close cooperation 
with the software developers to create and implement a process. Moore’s notion of the core product, 
the whole product, and the expanded product (1998) can be used to make processes easier to adopt and 
use and hence support process push strategies. Eason’s implementation strategies (1998) - big bang, 
parallel running, phased introduction, trials and dissemination, and incremental evolution – can be 
used to design implementation processes with appropriate degrees of practice pull. We can finally 
view the workshop model by Pries-Heje and Tryde (2001) as a practical approach to design an 
implementation strategy with a strong process push and practice pull that is suited to the particular 
needs of particular SPI efforts. 
5.2 Implications for Practice 
Software organizations can learn from the experiences from Ericsson. Most obviously, organizations 
should avoid Dead End Street initiatives and strongly prefer Highway initiatives. Dead End Street 
initiatives are definite failures. No initiative should be launched if the perceived need for the new 
process is low and the SPI team lacks the skills or commitment to develop and design the process. 
Highway initiatives are in contrast quite likely to succeed. If the organization has identified a number 
of possible initiatives it should for that reason give high priority to those that are actively requested by 
the software developers and that fit well with the competencies and preferences of its SPI 
practitioners. It is, however, not always possible to choose the Highway to process implementation; 
new processes might be needed without the active consent of software developers, and new types of 
processes might be needed that do not match previous experiences and preferences amongst the 
organization’s SPI practitioners.  
Country Road and Crossroads initiatives are interesting border cases with less certain outcomes. In 
such cases additional initiatives might create implementation success. The intention up front in the 
cases reported from Ericsson was, however, to achieve implementation success without additional 
efforts. In that case you will find it difficult to create the necessary commitment to re-launch an 
initiative. But if you realize that you are about to launch a border case with limited process push or 
with limited practice pull you need to adopt complementary tactics from the very start. Limited 
practice pull can be addressed through: software developer participation (Aaen 2002), incremental 
evolution (Eason 1988), or by tailoring the first version of the process to the particular needs of one 
project (Moore 1998; Börjesson and Mathiassen, 2003). Limited process push can be addressed 
through: early adoption of implementation workshops (Pries-Heje and Tryde 2001), software 
developer leadership (Aaen 2002), or by facilitating and strengthening the initiative by involving SPI 
consultants. 
SPI practitioners should appreciate the distinction between a described process and a software 
practice. A described process is a prescription for intended practices. They are similar in nature to 
methods, templates and guidelines and they belong to our repertoire of espoused theories (Argyris and 
Schön 1978). Software practices are shaped and reshaped as part of an organization’s tradition for 
developing software. They are enacted through the efforts of an organization’s software developers 
and they are expressions of the developers’ theories-in-use (Argyris and Schön 1978). Appreciating 
this difference will make SPI practitioners focus on the challenges related to process implementation, 
and it will, according to Argyris and Schön, stimulate their ongoing learning about SPI. Such an 
understanding would be a constant reminder that it is important to emphasize implementation issues 
from the very start of an initiative, it would encourage them to conduct implementation workshops 
(Pries-Heje and Tryde 2001), and it would challenge them to develop a practical understanding of the 
tactics involved in facilitating high process push and high practice pull.  
Limitations 
It is important to stress that the experiences in this paper are related to the particular context of 
Ericsson and that the 18 initiatives were evaluated in terms of their implementation success, i.e. the 
degree to which they led to actual changes in practices. Real success in SPI should be evaluated in 
terms of their improvement success, i.e. the degree to which they lead to better practices. The 
experiences from Ericsson do, however, strongly suggest that a combination of strong process push 
and practice pull is a key prerequisite for successful SPI initiatives.  
In case study research there are a number of factors that can affect the outcome of the result. Other 
factors apart from practice pull and process push can, of course, also affect SPI implementation 
success. Börjesson and Mathiassen (2003) argue that the distribution of effort and the number of 
software projects targeted by an SPI initiative are other important factors the affect implementation 
success. Other possible factors are the complexity of the process area in question, the competencies 
and experiences of the involved practitioners and change agents, and the degree of iteration adopted to 
successfully meet practical needs. Further research is needed to learn and understand how these 
different factors correlate and affect the outcome of SPI implementation efforts. 
6 CONCLUSION 
18 different SPI initiatives conducted within Ericsson during 1998-2001 have been explored and 
contrasted. The study draws, in this way, on data from one particular company, but it analyses 
experiences across several, different initiatives. The Ericsson experience suggests that the High Way 
with its combination of strong push and strong pull is the most promising road to implementation 
success, whereas the other roads imply serious barriers to success. This finding provides useful 
guidance for SPI practice, but the data also raise relevant issues for further research such as how other 
factors in combination with less strong process push or practice pull can facilitate successful SPI 
implementation. The key literature on SPI (e.g. Humphrey 1989; McFeeley 1996) addresses the 
implementation issue, but there is little practical guidance and no distinction is made conceptually 
between process and practice. Our research suggests that SPI practitioners must appreciate this 
distinction and its many implications for SPI.  
Appendix  
# Process Push Practice Pull Implementation Success 
1 Weak. SPI participants focused 
mainly on process description 
on a generic level that all 
involved parties could agree on. 
No commitment from SPI 
participants to bring process into 
action.  
Weak. Involved SW projects 
focused mainly on making 
generic process descriptions. 
They were eager to solve the 
problems on a general level, but 
little commitment to use the 
results. 
Low. The result was considered 
hard to use out-of-the-box. Part of 
the results was used indirectly as 
SPI participants worked in different 
projects and applied knowledge 
fragments there. 
2 Weak. SPI participants focused 
mainly on process description 
on a generic level that all 
involved parties could agree on. 
No commitment from SPI 
participants to bring process into 
action.  
Weak. Involved SW projects 
focused mainly on making 
generic process descriptions. 
They were eager to solve the 
problems on a general level, but 
little commitment to use the 
results. 
Medium/Low. The intention was to 
give the company a framework for 
design. The results were mainly 
implemented in one project where 
one of the SPI participants worked. 
3 Weak. SPI participants focused 
mainly on process description 
on a generic level that all 
involved parties could agree on. 
Limited time for mentoring and 
support to bring the process into 
action.  
Medium. Involved SW projects 
dedicated to solve generic 
process problems, but only one 
project manager interested in 
testing the results in action. 
Low. The results were tried out in 
one project, but the project ran into 
a number of difficulties. As the 
support was weak no one could 
help the project. The SPI initiative 
was no longer available to make the 
necessary changes.  
4 Weak. SPI participants focused 
on identifying historical data. 
Few historical data had been 
recorded so far. Few activities 
planned to communicate the 
results. 
Weak. Managers were very 
eager to find out about historical 
data, but the commitment to 
change was very low when few 
historical data were found. 
Low. The purpose of the SPI 
initiative was to build a database of 
old data and take action from there. 
No data of interest were found. No 
modified actions were taken when 
that result became known. 
5 Weak. SPI participants Strong. The result was focused Medium. An estimated 50% of 
dedicated to define and describe 
process. But no plans for how to 
deploy the process and follow 
up to support its use in action. 
to support managers who were 
asking for help and interested in 
applying the results. 
managers used the new process. 
Some did not know about it or were 
not given the opportunity to learn 
about it. Assistance was sometimes 
needed to interpret everything in 
the right way. Supporting 
guidelines were provided for 
managers.  
6 Weak. SPI participants focused 
on solving generic problems by 
defining a process. Too little 
time was planned to help the 
project make use of the result. 
Weak. Many believed in 
performing systematic module 
tests, but no one was committed 
and given the time to work with 
implementation of the results in 
action 
Medium/Low. The process was 
only used where SPI participants 
were members of a project or where 
a section manager strongly believed 
in systematic module tests. 
7 Weak. SPI participants were 
only given time to define a 
process. No time to implement it 
in projects. 
Weak. Almost all project 
managers believed it was 
necessary to have a good 
follow-up on a project, but only 
one was committed and willing 
to try the results out in practice. 
Everyone else wanted to wait to 
see if someone else benefited 
from the process. 
Medium/Low. The process was 
only used in one project supported 
by the driver of the SPI initiative. 
The project managed to implement 
the process and to use it. The 
project was content with the 
outcome. The result was not used 
again after that. 
8 Weak. The SPI participants 
were focused on solving the 
problem through a well defined 
process. 
Medium. The managers 
believed in supporting resource 
handling and most of them were 
willing to use the result. 
Medium. An estimated 75% of 
managers used the new process. 
Those not using the results were 
either not assisted in using it or just 
did not believe in the approach.  
9 Weak. Most of the time was 
spent on define how to work 
with requirements management 
and almost no time was planned 
for SPI participants to help 
implement the results in action. 
Weak. Everyone knew it is 
important to manage 
requirements, but no one was 
committed to take the results 
into action in their own project. 
Low. The results were hard to use 
out-of-the-box. The results were 
mainly used as a framework by the 
members of the SPI Initiative. 
10 Strong. Time was made 
available for the SPI participants 
to help implement the results in 
the project. 
Weak. The targeted project was 
interested, but was not 
committed to spend time to 
make the change happen. 
Medium. This Initiative was started 
because the impact of the previous 
RM initiative was low. It was 
decided to focus on one project and 
make it happen there. All of the 
results were designed to suit the 
needs of that project. The receivers 
were however not committed 
enough to assure that the results 
were used in a beneficial way for 
the project. 
11 Weak. There was a strong focus 
from the SPI participants to 
solve the problems. But the 
resulting process was not 
grounded in current practices. 
No time was planned for 
activities to make change 
happen. 
Weak. There was a high 
commitment to create better 
routines for subcontract 
management, but no time was 
planned for the projects to bring 
the new process into action. 
Low. The results needed further 
adaptation to be useful for different 
projects, but no effort was made to 
tailor the results. Some of the 
results were indirectly used by SPI 
participants in different projects. 
12 Strong. Time was made 
available for SPI participants to 
mentor and support the project 
in action. The SPI initiative was 
dedicated to solve the problems 
Strong. There was a high 
commitment from a few highly 
respected practitioners that 
helped assure that the results 
were used in action.  
High. The process was adapted to 
the specific needs of a certain 
project, but needed further 
adaptation to be used in action. The 
SPI participants and practitioners 
for one project. solved these problems jointly and 
made the change happen 
13 Strong. The SPI participants 
planed the deployment activities 
and time was made available for 
mentoring and support. 
Strong. A few well respected 
practitioners were (after a few 
struggling weeks) convinced 
about the need for improved 
A&D practices and they were 
committed to make it happen in 
action. 
Medium/High. The A&D area is 
complex and several iterations of 
trying out processes in action were 
needed before the result was 
satisfactory. Due to the strong push 
and pull the change was 
implemented and used. 
14 Strong. The SPI participants 
were given time to participate in 
the project to support 
implementation of the results. 
Strong. The practitioners were 
receptive to adopt a stronger 
focus on implementation and 
they participated actively in the 
change process.  
High. Two slightly different 
adaptations were made to fit the 
different needs of different products 
that were developed on different 
sites. Collaboration between SPI 
participants and SW engineers 
made the change happen. 
15 Strong. The SPI initiative 
members participated in project 
tests and came to understand the 
specific needs of the tester. 
Strong. The practitioners came 
to understand that the SPI 
initiative was dedicated to 
respond to their specific needs 
and they became very 
committed to use the results in 
action. 
High. The result was adapted to the 
specific needs of a certain project. 
Difficulties were solved together 
between SPI participants and SW 
practitioners and the result was 
implemented and used. 
16 Strong. Competent resources 
were dedicated for daily 
mentoring and support to make 
the change happen in action. 
Strong. The configuration 
managers were highly involved 
in both defining and deploying 
the results. 
High. Within CM there are 
hundreds of possible solutions for 
each specific situation. This 
required extra attention to be able to 
choose one and focus on making 
that happen. The dedication of the 
practitioners played a key role. 
17 Strong. The SPI participants 
overlapped with the persons 
who were going to use the 
results. The SPI commitment to 
the initiative was very high. 
Strong. The project managers 
wanted to implement their own 
ideas and took the time to do it. 
High. The results were used in 
action and the project managers 
continued to be dedicated to 
participate in SPI work within 
project management. 
18 Strong. The SPI participants saw 
the new of a well defined 
process development map to be 
able to communicate and deploy 
all SPI work. 
Strong. All SW engineers 
needed a process description to 
turn to get templates, guidelines 
and other relevant information. 
High. The use of the development 
process map is measured in both 
“hits” and subjective opinions of 
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